Co-operative Marketing Associations by Ballantine, Henry W.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1924
Co-operative Marketing Associations
Henry W. Ballantine
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ballantine, Henry W., "Co-operative Marketing Associations" (1924). Minnesota Law Review. 1458.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1458
MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
VOL. VIII DECEMBER, 1923 No. 1
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS
By HENRY W. BALLANTINE*
1. CO-OPERATION AND COLLECTIVE MARKETING
A GRICULTURAL depression is giving great impetus to the
co-operative movement." There are many who believe that
the co-operative marketing system is the most hopeful measure
yet inaugurated to improve the financial condition of the -farmer
and to enable the producer to obtain just returns. In over
thirty states, acts providing for the formation of co-operative
marketing associations, along lines followed by the raisin
growers, prune and apricot growers in California, have re-
cently been enacted. Large marketing associations cover-
ing certain commodities produced in whole states or even
groups of states, have been organized, notably by the cotton
and tobacco growers in Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Kentucky,
North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin and other states. The large
fruit growers' co-operatives on the Pacific coast are a dominant
factor in the marketing of fruit products and have an annual
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'On co-operative marketing associations, see article by Hender-
son in 23 Columbia L. Rev. 91. Arndt, The Law of California Co-operativeMarketing Associations, S Cal. Law Rev. 281, 384, 9 Cal. Law Rev.
44, and L. S. Hulbert, Legal Phases of Co-operative Associations,
Bull. 1106, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture (a pamphlet published by the
Department of Agriculture, designed to assist persons engaged in
forming these associations); see also 22 Columbia L. Rev. 470; Miller,
7 Cornell L. Quar. 293; 32 Yale L. Jour. 819; Brown, I N. Car. L.
Rev. 216; Sapiro, 8 Iowa L. Bull. 193; Farmers Co-operation in Min-
nesota, (1917-1922) February 1923, H. B. Price, Div. Agr. Econ. U. of
Minn., Bull. 202; Local Co-operative Potato Marketing in Minnesota,
Black, Div. Agr. Econ. Sept. 1921, Bull. 195; Co-operative Central
Marketing Organizations, forthcoming bulletin- by Black and Price,
Div. Agr. Econ.
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turnover estimated at over $300,000,000. Co-operative market-
ing on a national scale is now being urged for the salvation of
the wheat growers.
In Minnesota we have had statutes for the organization of
co-operative associations since 1870.2 The number of such asso-
ciations, the membership and the quantity of products handled
are very large. Much has been done in this state by local co-
operatives, but the greatest discussion at present is with refer-
ence to the possibilities of central or federated marketing.' We
have here at present eleven such organizations. In Minnesota in
1922 there were 4,500 local co-operatives; among these there are
63 co-operative cheese factories; 644 co-operative creameries;
699 co-operative live stock shipping associations; 183 co-opera-
tive stores; 149 potato growers' associations; 161 township mu-
tual fire insurance companies; 1,739 farmers' rural telephone
companies; and 260 miscellaneous associations. Some 2,000 of
these are selling organizations; some 200 are buying organiza-
tions; some 500 are production organizations. No other state
has so large a percentage of farmers selling their products through
co-operatives.
A new act drafted especially to authorize the organization of
large co-operative marketing associations was adopted by the
1923 legislature.4 This is substantially the same as a standard
act drafted by Mr. Aaron Sapiro of San Francisco and re-
cently adopted in about thirty states. The policy of the law in
providing for the organization of these marketing associations is
declared in a preamble of the act to be in substance as follows:
To promote the intelligent marketing of agricultural prod-
ucts; to eliminate speculation by middlemen; to make the distribu-
tion of agricultural products as direct as possible between pro-
ducer and consumer; and to stabilize the market. It is recognized
2Minn., Laws, 1870, chap. 29; Minn., G. S., 1878, chap. 34, sec. 155;
Minn., G.S., 1894, sec. 2903-2912; Minn., R.L., 1905, sec. 3073-3078; Minn.,
G.S., 1913, sec. 6479-6485. See also Minn., Laws, 1919, chap. 382;
Minn., Laws, 1921, chap. 23; Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 326.
sIn the "federated" type of organization the central organization
or exchange often acts merely as the selling agent for the locals, with
little or no effort at collective -bargaining. In the "centralized" type,
the organization seeks control of a large part of the supply of the
crop or commodity to be marketed, so that the flow can be regulated
and the price influenced. The difference between the two is in the
degree of centralization and control over the supply and the move-
ment to market; and the status of the local associations. See Co-
operative Central Marketing Organizations, Bulletin by Black and
Price.
4Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 264.
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that agriculture is characterized by individual production, and
the public interest demands that the farmer be permitted and
encouraged to attain group or collective marketing, and the ad-
vantages that may be derived from combination and the exercise
of the merchandizing skill exhibited by large manufacturing and
commercial corporations.
The defects of individual marketing by agricultural producers
are notorious.' There is usually no uniform system of grading
or packing. There is variation in price for the same grade be-
tween individuals in the same market. Owing to lack of handling
and of storage facilities, prices are depressed and the market is
frequently glutted during the harvesting period. There is no
adequate financing or marketing skill. The buying interests are
highly organized and possibly in collusion, whereas the in-
dividual sellers are weak financially and at a bargaining
disadvantage. By co-operative marketing, the theory is that
the farmer may collectively market his farm products with
proper grading, packing, storage, shipping, advertising, and
financing, and sell them through expert selling agents,
as the market can absorb the product. The net proceeds are
distributed equally, not as profits on capital, but as the price of
the commodities. It is claimed that central co-operative market-
ing will provide for control of quality and the standardizing of
production; the adjusting of production to consumption by scien-
tific information as to the demand; the control of the flow of
commodities to the market by selling a certain proportion of
the crop each month instead of dumping it all at once, thus
taking advantage of the seasonal variation in the price; the
distribution of the product among different markets which can
absorb it; and the elimination of middlemen, profiteers and
speculators.
The individual producer and the local co-operative association
are frequently not in a strong enough position as sellers to realize
a full price for their products; hence the need for "collective
bargaining." The purpose is to put the seller upon an equal
basis of bargaining power with the buyer and take away from
the buyer any unfair advantages. The idea is not that of creating
a monopoly in favor of agricultural producers, but to allow such
combination and co-operation as to give equality of advantage.
It has been said by the North Carolina court in Tobacco Growers
5See Sapiro, 8 Iowa L. Bull. 193; Brown, 1 N. Car. L. Rev. 216.
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Co-operative Ass'n v. Jones," "the co-operative association pur-
poses to prevent artificially forced reduction in the price paid
to the producers. Instead of creating a monopoly, the object is
by a rational method of putting the raw product on the market
from time to time as there is a legitimate demand for its manu-
facture, and by the extension of credit to farmers" to enable
them to secure a fair and reasonable price without oppressing the
consumer. "Middlemen, speculators, and people who stood be-
tween the producers and consumers derived excessive profits
from this situation, while the producers and laborers were denied
a living, and from the consumers were extorted enormous profits."
The movement is thus explained by one prominent organizer :7
"The one great aim of co-operative marketing is to abolish
the individual dumping of farm produce and to substitute for
it the merchandising of farm products, the controlled movement
of crops into the markets of the world at such times and in such
quantities that those markets can absorb the crops at fair prices.
. . . Thousands of small local movements, good for cer-
tain localized purposes, do not realize how futile and useless they
have been as marketers. . . . The farmers still dump their
grain or their butter or their cheese against each other, and they
break their own markets."
What is being urged is that the local plants federate for
orderly marketing and centralized selling on a co-operative basis.
The co-operative features of these organizations which dis-
tinguish them from ordinary business corporations' are, in the
first place, that the profits are divided among the members or
patrons in proportion to the amount of products or patronage,
giving only a limited return to the stockholders in the nature of
interest rather than of speculators' profit. Dividends on capital
stock are generally limited to eight per cent, and the proceeds of
the business go to the producer rather than to the capitalist. It
is also one of the leading ideas that the management shall not
be dominated by a few large stockholders, but that the principle
of "one man, one vote" shall be observed. Membership is limited
to producers or those who furnish the business, although some
business may be done for non-members. Stock cannot be trans-
ferred except with the consent of the directors. The services
rendered by the association are in general to be conducted at
cost for the benefit of patrons rather than for the profit of stock-
holders.
6(N. Car. 1923) 117 S.E. 174, 178.
7Sapiro, 8 Iowa L. Bull. 193.
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In Mooney v. Farmers Mercantile & Elevator Co.,8 the ques-
tion was whether the method of distributing the earnings of the
company, a co-operative association organized in 1899, as fixed
by a by-law, pro rata to the amount of business each had fur=
nished during the year in the form of products, violated the
right of a stockholder who claimed distribution to the stock-
holders in proportion to the stock held by each. It was held that
under the statute then in force, such distribution was authorized
although in an ordinary corporation formed for commercial pur-
poses, profits must be evenly divided among the stockholders
according to the amount of stock held by each. But in a co-
operative association, the fundamental purpose is to distribute the
profits, aside from a fair return on capital, to those who by their
patronage make a realization thereof possible, and in proportion
as they thus contribute to the business and prosperity of the
company.
In considering some of the outstanding legal problems that
arise in connection with co-operative marketing and the organiza-
tion of co-operative associations, we shall take up first the relation
between the corporation and the state, particularly the constitu-
tionality of laws which exempt the farmer from the anti-trust
acts, federal and state, which make it illegal for persons to
enter into combinations for the purpose of stifling competition.
Related to this is the question of the validity of the so-called
"membership contracts" for exclusive marketing through the asso-
ciation, one purpose of which often is to control as large a pro-
portion of the supply as possible and to dominate the market, as
well as to furnish an assured volume of business and basis of
credit. These contracts present an exception to the policy of un-
trammelled competition in the channels of state and interstate
trade, which is ordinarily considered necessary to prevent undue
enhancement of prices.
Next the relation between the association and its members
will be considered, under contracts of agency and sale, particu-
larly with reference to the question whether there is in reality
a relation of agency or trusteeship even when the contract pur-
ports to be an out and out sale. In connection with the mem-
bership contracts, the special remedies provided for their en-
forcement are a matter of considerable practical importance. The
Minnesota legislation relating to co-operative marketing associa-
8(1917) 138 Minn. 199, 164 N.W. 804.
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tions and co-operative associations generally, will be summarized
and compared, with a view to indicating the peculiar co-opera-
tive features of these corporations, showing the advantages
offered by the different statutes under which organization may
take place, and tabulating the surprising variation in the different
acts drawn by different factions in the legislature, but having
the same general purpose. Finally the method of securing exemp-
tion from federal income taxes will be indicated.
II. THE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ACTS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
BOTH UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
By the Minnesota anti-trust act, trusts and combinations in
restraint of trade are prohibited.' It is provided by this act:
"No person or association of persons shall enter into any
pool, trust agreement, combination, or understanding whatsoever
with any other person or association, corporate or otherwise, in
restraint of trade, within this state, or between the people of
this or any other state or country, or which tends in any way or
degree to limit, fix, control, maintain or regulate the price of
any article of trade, manufacture, or use bought and sold within
the state, or which limits or tends to limit the production of any.
such article, or which prevents or limits competition in the pur-
chase and sale thereof, or which tends or is designed so to do."
Violation is made a felony. Even though competition be so
keen as to be ruinous, combination to eliminate it is illegal.10 A
combination contract, or understanding, the direct and necessary
effect of which is to stifle or restrict competition in trade, violates
the anti-trust statute, whatsoever may have been the intention
of the parties. 1 Agreements between dealers which attempt to
control the market, fix prices, and avoid competition, are, in
general, held illegal as in restraint of trade. 12
The co-operative marketing acts adopted in most of the states
provide expressly that co-operative associations of farmers or-
ganized thereunder, shall not be deemed to be combinations in
restraint of trade or illegal monopolies. By the standard co-
operative marketing act, adopted by Minnesota in 1923,13 it is
9Minn., R. L., 1905, sec. 5168; Minn., G. S., 1913, sec. 8973; Minn.,
Laws, 1923, p. 311.
'
0 State V. Creamery Package Co., (1910) 110 Minn. 415, 431, 126
N.W. 126, 623.
"See State v. Duluth Board of Trade, (1909) 107 Minn. 506, 121
N.W. 395, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 260. See also note, 11 A.L.R. 1185.
12Brent v. Gay, (1912) 149 Ky. 615, 149 S.W. 915, 41 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1034; People v. Butler, (Mich. 1923) 192 N.W. 685. 3 Williston,
Contracts, secs. 1648, 1653, 1658.
13Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 264, sec. 28.
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS
declared that such associations shall not be considered in re-
straint of trade.
"No association organization (sic) hereunder shall be deemed
to be a combination in restraint of trade or an illegal monopoly;
or an attempt to lessen competition or fix prices arbitrarily; nor
shall the marketing contracts or agreements between the associa-
tion and its members or any agreement authorized in this act be
considered illegal or in unlawful restraint of trade, or as a part
of a conspiracy or combination to accomplish an improper or
illegal purpose."
By the general co-operative association act,"4 co-operative asso-
ciations are authorized to sell the products of their members
or patrons either individually or collectively, and to negotiate
prices individually or collectively and to join with other co-op-
erative associations to form district, state, or national organiza-
tions, or marketing agencies.
By the federal Capper-Volstead Act approved February 18,
1922, it is provided that persons engaged in the production. of
agricultural products may act together in associations, corporate
or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively market-
ing such products in interstate and foreign commerce. Such asso-
ciations are authorized to have marketing agencies in common
and to make the necessary contracts to effect such purposes. This
act is a statutory declaration by Congress that "collective mar-
keting" by such associations, (a term borrowed from the "col-
lective bargaining" of labor unions), shall not be deemed a viola-
tion of the federal anti-trust laws. A safeguard is, however,
provided in the duty imposed on the secretary of agriculture, if
he shall have reason to believe that any such association mon-
opolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to
such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly
enhanced, to serve upon such association a complaint requiring
the association to show cause why an order should not be made
declaring it to cease from such restraint. His order may be en-
forced by proceedings in the federal courts.
Associations in order to come within this act must comply
with the following conditions: They must be operated for the
mutual benefit of the members thereof, as producers; they must
be so organized that no member of the association is allowed
more than one vote because of the amount of stock or member-
ship capital he may own therein, or, that the association does not
14Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 326, sec. 1, p. 467.
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pay dividends in excess of eight per cent per annum. The asso-
ciation must not deal in the products of non-members to an
amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for
members.
The Clayton Act' 5 passed by Congress in 1914 provided in
section 6 that nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricul-
tural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit;
nor shall such organizations be held or considered to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-
trust laws. The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, however, applies
to associations with or without capital stock. The brakes are
taken off in order that higher prices may be obtained by the
farmers than they can get by selling individually.
The question that first arises in connection with this legis-
lation is as to the constitutionality of acts which exempt farmers'
co-operative marketing associations from the anti-trust laws. May
the states by general laws prohibit combinations in restraint of
trade, make the maintenance of competition the general rule,
and at the same time permit farmers to combine to restrict com-
petition and market their products collectively for the purpose
of obtaining fair and remunerative prices? Is this class legis-
lation? Does the law create a special privilege in the attempt to
exempt farmers to this extent from a law applicable to others?
Is this equal protection of the laws?
It is believed that the co-operative marketing acts are consti-
tutional both under the state and the federal constitutions. The
public policy of the United States and of the states now'favors
the organization of farmers for collective marketing in order to
obtain a fair return, and the classification of farmers as a group
distinct from citizens engaged in other callings is reasonable
and natural. It is not vicious class legislation, but in the common
interest.
As we have already seen, co-operative marketing is collective
selling. One aim is to make possible better profits by massed selling
through large organizations. It aims to eliminate ruinous in-
dividual competition. It aims to control, where possible, the sale
of more than half of the supply, and to be the largest factor in
the market. The larger the proportion of the crop of a given
commodity that is pooled, the greater the control of the market
1538 Stat. at L. 730.
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and the more stabilizing the effect on prices. The system of
exclusive marketing contracts by which the member is bound to
deliver his crop to the association for a period of years, tends
to insure both a volume of business and a control of the market.
Some co-operative marketing associations already control the sale
of more than half the commodities in which they are operating.
All of them are striving to become as large as possible, and to
market a dominant portion of the crop. These crops are neces-
saries of life. Is there any danger here from oppressive mon-
opolies or trusts ?
It is believed that as a matter of practical economics co-opera-
tive marketing associations have not the power to become danger-
ous trusts. They cannot control or limit production. Unduly
increased prices will promptly increase production and lower prices
will follow.
The principal authority against the validity of legislation
exempting farmers from state anti-trust acts, is the case decided
in 1902 by the Supreme Court of Ccnnolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Company.' In that chse it was held that the exemption of farm-
ers from the anti-trust statute of Illinois rendered the act uncon-
stitutional and that the whole statute was void. Since that case
was decided, the attitude of the courts in the construction of
the anti-trust laws has undergone a change. It is now recognized
that not all combinations or contracts which in any degree tend
to restrict competition are per se illegal. Such a strict rule would
invalidate innumerable legitimate business transactions. If the
main purpose and effect of a combination are to foster trade and
increase business, and if it does not exercise improper control
or unduly and unreasonably restrict competition, then it is held
not to be in violation of the law.' It is now the view of the
United States Supreme Court that the illegality of combinations
depends upon the test whether their power is abused and whether
prejudice results to the public interest.'8 To give immunity to
farmers to do acts harmful to others would be unconstitutional;
but if farmers' combinations are in fact not injurious, their exis-
tence is permissible. Courts must consider the actual economic
conditions to determine whether there has been an abuse of the
power of classification in legalizing co-operative or collective
16(1902) 184 U.S. 540, 22 S.C.R. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679.
17State v. Duluth Board of Trade, (1909) 107 Minn. 506, 544, 121
N.W. 395.
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1910) 221 U.S. 1, 55 L. Ed.
830, 31 S.C.R. 704.
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marketing by farmers. The decision of the constitutionality of
laws often turns upon a judgment upon practical matters of busi-
ness policy and not upon anything contained in the constitution.
It has accordingly been held in a nilmber of recent cases that
the legislature may legalize combinations of farmers for the pur-
pose of obtaining fair and remunerative prices; and that the classi-
fication of farmers as a class distinct from those engaged in
other business is reasonable. It is based upon economic differences
between agriculture and other lines of industry.1 9
As is well said by Mr. J. D. Miller in an article on Farmers'
Co-Operative Associations as Legal Combinations :20
"It is safe to assume that the changed conditions since the
decision in the case of Connolly v. Uuion Sewer Pipe Co.,
21 will
cause the Supreme Court to restrict the authority of that case
to its own facts. This it has essentially done in Iiternational
Harvester Co. v. Missouri ;22 while the facts found by the legis-
lature of the state of New York show that such laws were not
an arbitrary discrimination, but rather a reasonable classification
that would permit farmers to market their products in a way that
would inure to the benefit of all the people of the state...
"The result is not that farmers are exempted from liability
for a wrong done or threatened, but that it is legislatively de-
clared that their combined efforts are not injurious but beneficial
to the public interest. . . . The law is not so poor a thing
that it prevents the state from authorizing combinations that will
promote the public good and at the same time prohibiting com-
binations detrimental to the public good."
III. EXCLUSIVE MARIETING CONTRACTS Do NOT RESTRAIN
TRADE.
Co-operative marketing associations, as we have seen, are
lawful organizations and their creation is within the legislative
power. So long as they carry out legitimate objects by lawful
means and use their combined power fairly they call for public
encouragement. It has been contended, however, that the system
of exclusive marketing contracts with members and patrons should
be held void as against public policy and contrary to state anti-
'
9Tobacco Co-operative Ass'n v. Jones, (N. Car. 1923) 117 S.E.
174; Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 246
S. W. 1068; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass'n v. Schulte, (Kan. 1923) 216
Pac. 311, 315; Owen Co. Burley Tob. Soc. v. Brumback, (1908) 128 Ky.
137, 107 S.W. 710; Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op. Ass'n (Miss. 1923)
96 So. 849.
207 Cornell L. Quart. 293-308.
21(1902) 184 U.S. 540, 22 S.C.R. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679, affirming 99
Fed. 354.
22(1914) 234 U.S. 199, 58 L. Ed. 1276, 34 S.C.R. 859.
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trust acts and the Sherman anti-trust law. The problem here is
how far co-operative organizations may limit the freedom of their
members and interfere with the chances of competing buyers.
Would it be lawful, for example, to make a contract or by-law
which would place a limitation on the company's members in dis-
posing of their products which might last for life? It has been
held by the English courts that such by-laws would be an un-
reasonable restraint of trade in view of the unlimited duration
of the contract as it imposes a greater restraint than is reasonably
required for the protection of the organization.23  Stipulations
unduly restricting personal liberty are invalid.
Agreements for exclusive dealing are valid except where such
contract is part of a scheme by which it is sought to establish
an unlawful monopoly. A contract to buy from or deal in the
goods of one person has generally been held valid. 24  As we
have seen, there is little practical danger of an agricultural mon-
opoly. If the restraint of competition is reasonable, if it does
not result in oppression of competitors, the manipulation of prices
to the public injury, it may be lawful. In certain decisions, how-
ever, such exclusive dealing contracts have been held invalid.
Thus in the Turnipseed Case in Alabama, it was pointed out that
the parties to the contract were attempting to become masters of
the situation so far as concerned the sale and disposition of at
least sixty per cent of the peach crop of the country, by contracts
giving the corporation the absolute right under penalty to handle
their fruit crop. It was held that these contracts were contrary
to public policy, since the desire of the parties was to stifle and
destroy competition at the various markets among the growers
who became members of the association. 25
In Burns v. Wrav Farmers Grain Company,26 a by-law of a
corporation organized to purchase farm produce, the stock of
which was held by the farmers of a community, imposed a penalty
on any member who sold produce to a competitor of the cor-
poration. It was held that this was invalid as an unreasonable
restraint of competition. It was a combination to prevent other
grain buyers from doing business at Wray. It would tend to give
the association or company a monopoly.
23McEllestrim v. Ballymacelligott, etc., Society, [1919] App. Cas.
548, 564.
24See 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1645.2GGa. Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed, (1915) 9 Ala. App. 123, 62
So. 542. Cf. Ex parte Baldwin Co. Producers Ass'n, (1919) 203 Ala.
345, 83 So. 69.26(1918) 65 Colo. 428, 178 Pac. 487, 11 A.L.R. 1179.
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The leading decision against the validity of exclusive dealing
contracts is Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-operative Society.27
The action was brought by a middleman who complained of inter-
ference with his right to carry on business as a hog buyer. The
defendant company was a corporation whose stockholders con-
sisted for the most part of farmers producing hogs. Defendant's
business was to buy hogs from these producers and others and
to resell them. One of its by-laws required members to sell to
it exclusively all their marketable produce and live stock and
prescribed as penalty for sale to others the forfeiture of part of
the purchase price, viz. five cents per one hundred pounds. Reeves,
as a competing buyer in the same market, sued to enjoin the
defendant society from collecting from its members any sum
for such forfeiture. The Iowa statute forbade contracts and
combinations in restraint of free competition in buying and selling
commodities and gave a remedy to any person injured. It was
held that selling agencies are not illegal, but to annex a penalty
to the exercise of the right to sell to outsiders freely is to restrict
trade and competition. This was an undue restraint of competi-
tion injurious to the plaintiff; therefore an injunction was granted
against enforcing it. The court said:
"That such fine or penalty made the society an illegal one is
to our minds too clear for argument. Plaintiff was placed at a
disadvantage and could not compete with the society in pur-
chasing hogs from its members, and the members were not free
to deal with plaintiff."
The ground of this decision is not entirely clear; but it seems
that the wrong to the plaintiff was based upon an unlawful con-
spiracy to boycott or eliminate middlemen in the local market and
market products collectively. The decision has been criticized
on the ground that the purpose of tle by-laws was in fact simply
to establish a selling agency for the handling of the products of
the members; it was apparently not the purpose to increase the
price of the produce to the consumer, but rather to obtain, as far
as possible, the full price paid by the consumer, and eliminate
the expense of the middleman. The case may perhaps be ex-
plained as 'an application of the Iowa anti-trust statute. The
combination would prevent competition among the organized
growers in the local market in order that they might avail them-
selves of prices made in wider markets. The decision seems out
of line with the recent statutes and the present policy of the
27(1913) 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1104.
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS
state and federal governments in regard to authorizing collective
marketing for the purpose of eliminating such expenses as those
involved in employing the services of middlemen and speculators.
Combination of laborers or producers for the betterment of
their members are not necessarily illegal because they sever busi-
ness dealings with an outsider. As Justice Holmes points out,2 8
the organization of the world means an ever increasing might
and scope of combinations. In labor cases, the law has come to
countenance associations of laborers to secure united and so
effective action to carry on business profitably, to bargain on a
collective basis, to boycott non-union employers, and to enforce
concessions from combinations or individuals with whom they
deal. Farmers cannot successfully carry on business as so many
unrelated, isolated units. The individual farmer cannot be ex-
pected to pit his feeble bargaining power against the might of
organized capital.
The existence of co-operative associations and collective mar-
keting are expressly authorized by the law of this state and of
the United States. By one of our statutes it is declared that the
marketing contracts or agreements between the association and
its members requiring the members to sell for any period of time,
not over five years, all or any specified part of their agricultural
products exclusively to or through the association, are valid and
shall not be considered illegal or an unlawful restraint of trade,
or as a part of an illegal conspiracy or combination. What is
specifically authorized under one act could hardly be held invalid
under the other, especially where such exclusive dealing contracts
are a proper means of carrying out the general purposes which
are authorized.
This, of course, does not mean that a co-operative association
is privileged to carry on a harmful monopoly or indulge in arbi-
trary methods. Contracts between co-operative associations and
their members for exclusive dealing over a period of years, espe-
cially where authorized by statute, have now been upheld by a
number of states as not being an undue restraint of trade. It is
recognized that they are part of a system of collective marketing,
that the purpose is merely to secure a fair and reasonable price
for the products and that such contracts are not to be condemned
where they are not in fact hostile to the public welfare.29
2sVegelahn v. Guntner, (1896) 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 35
L.R.A. 722, 57 A.S.R. 443.29Brown v. Staple Cotton Ass'n, (Miss. 1923) 96 So. 849; Burley"
Tobacco Society v. Gillespie, (1912) 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N.E. 89;
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IV. AGEiCY OR SALE OR TRUST?
It is the view of some experts on co-operative marketing,
though not of all, that each association should have a strong and
stringent contract with its grower members and patrons provid-
ing for the delivery of their entire crop to the association for a
period of from three to seven years. The products may then be
graded and pooled for selling over a period of time. The associa-
tion agrees to deduct only the cost of doing business and some
reasonable reserves. The net proceeds are to be distributed among
the members so that each grower will receive as his pro rata share
of the proceeds, the average price of the season or of the pooling
period. i
These exclusive dealing contracts furnish not only a control
of the market and an assured volume of business, but also a
strong credit basis. The farmer must deliver his crop and can
be paid only the net proceeds. He agrees to deliver to the asso-
ciation outright all of the commodity that he raises for
several years. If this becomes an asset of the association, next
year's crop guarantees the obligations of the association.
The standard act authorizes and suggests in some detail the
terms of this marketing contract which the association may make
with its members, requiring the members to sell for any period
of time, not over five years, all or any part of their products
exclusively to or through the association. The kind of contract
adopted by the association may be either one of sale or one of
agency. If a contract of sale is adopted, it is declared that it shall
be conclusively held that the title to the products passes absolutely
and unreservedly, except for recorded liens, to the association upon
delivery. In a contract of sale, the price may be fixed by the
amount realized on a re-sale, or at a fixed minimum price plus the
increase secured on re-sale.
Anaheim Citrus Ass'n v. Yeoman, (1921) 51 Cal. App. 759, 197 Pac.
959; Ex Parte Baldwin County Ass'n, (1919) 203 Ala. 345, 83 So. 69;
Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Burley Tobacco Ass'n (1912) 147
Ky. 22, 143 S.W. 1040; Tobacco Growers Ass'n v. Jones, (N. Car. 1923)
117 S.E. 174; Oregon Growers Co-operative Ass'n v. Lentz, (Ore. 1923)
212 Pac. 811; Washington Cranberry Growers v. Moore, (1921) 117
Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773, 25 A.L.R. 1077; Oregon Growers Co-operative
Ass'n v. Lentz, (Ore. 1923) 212 Pac. 811; Casterland Milk and Cheese
Co. v. Shantz, (1919) 179 N.Y.S. 131; Bullville Milk Producers Ass'n
v. Armstrong, (1919) 108 Misc. 582, 178 N.Y.S. 612; Texas Farm
Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, (Tex. 1923) 253 S.W. 1101, reversing
248 S.W. 1109; Phez County v. Salem Fruit Union, (1922) 103 Ore.
514, 201 Pac. 222, 205 Pac. 970, 25 A.L.R. 1113; Kansas Wheat Grow-
ers Ass'n v. Schulte, (Kan. 1923) 216 Pac. 311.
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An agency contract may appoint the association the exclusive
marketing agent to sell the crop without taking title. The agency
contract will usually be a part of a pooling plan under which the
association agrees to divide ratably the proceeds of the sale of
the products of like variety and grade, after deducting all neces-
sary selling, overhead and other costs and expenses as in the
sale contract. The grower agrees to consign and deliver his crop
to the association as his agent and to surrender the exclusive con-
trol and disposition of it to the association. Whether the contract
be one of agency or of sale, the same remedies will be provided
and the contract may be specifically enforced.
An important question has been raised, whether even under
the contract of sale, the association does not stand in the relation
of agent or trustee rather than of buyer, and whether the mem-
bers do not stand in the position of principals or beneficiaries of
a trust rather than of sellers. In a recent article, Mr. G. C.
Henderson puts the following questions: Is the contributor to a
pool an equitable tenant in common of the mass? Is his right
an equitable property right in a fund or a mere contractual claim?
It may be contended that since the association has no claim upon
any profits, it has taken title merely for convenience in making
sales for the benefit of individual growers or in administering
certain property for the pro rata benefit of the members of a
pool.30 If this trust theory is adopted, it will have many important
consequences. The property in each pool, as Mr. Henderson
points out, could be administered solely for the benefit of the mem-
bers of that pool, and the association must segregate receipts and
maintain a separate trustee account for each pool. Distribution
to members of a pool could be made only out of receipts from
that pool. The commodities in the pool could be pledged only to
secure advances for members of the pool. They would not be
corporate assets.
It is believed, however, that the fact that the price is to be
governed by the amount realized on resale after deducting proper
expenses, is not a strong indication of a trust relationship. It
is a mere method of determining the purchase price. It is be-
lieved that Mr. Henderson conjures up a variety of complications
and complexities that are entirely foreign to the intention of the
parties, and without basis in their contract. If his suggestions
were well founded, the trust property would not be liable for the
30Henderson, Co-operative Marketing Associations, 23 Columbia
L. Rev. 91, Feb. 1923.
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debts of the association, and could not be levied on unless the
association were authorized to use such property for the general
purposes of the association. It would seem that when the crops
are delivered, they become corporate assets. If the association
incurs debts, it is possible that the proceeds even of the crops
of subsequent years could be applied to these debts.
In Oregon Growers v. Lentz,31 the court speaks of the con-
tract as an agency contract, appointing the association as agent
of the grower to market his product for his benefit and without
profit to the association. The contract itself provided that the
association should buy and that the grower agreed to sell all his
crop. The question whether the contract was one of agency or
of sale was, however, not before the court.
In Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association v. StoVall,3 2 the
court said:
"We do not find it necessary to determine whether the con-
tract was one of ordinary sale and ptrchase or" an agency con-
tract. The fact that the association is created primarily for co-
operative purposes, and not for profit, lends color to the theory
that it is an agency contract. But when the statute is examined
and the contract analyzed, it is quite plain that in essential aspects,
the contract is not one of agency as the term is ordinarily under-
stood.""3
The court concludes that it is clear that the parties intend that
the association shall take title and shall exercise all the rights
of ownership, and that the grower shall lose all dominion over
the crop. But the court said by way of dictum: "It is true that
the grower has at all times a beneficial interest in the net pro-
ceeds of the pool." This may be doubted on the ground that the
division of the proceeds is merely the method prescribed for
measuring the price. The member's remedy is not against the
crop or the proceeds, but on a contract with the association, which
is under a contractual duty to pay to the seller an amount deter-
mined by the net proceeds realized on resale. It is believed that
it is an entirely unwarranted theory to say that the object of
the parties in clothing the transaction in the terms of a sale
rather than in terms of agency, trust or consignment, is merely
to enable the association to deal with the goods freely, and that
in essence it is merely a trust or agency.
31(Ore. 1923) 212 Pac. 811.
a2(Tex. 1923) 253 S.W. 1107.
33See 23 R.C.L., 1216. D. M. Ferry & Co. v. Hall, (1914) 188 Ala.
178, 66 S. 104, L.R.A. 1917B 620.
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The question put by Mr. Henderson would then be answered
according to the understanding of those who drafted this law
and the marketing contracts under it, as follows: Q. Must each
pool be administered as a fiduciary unit? A. No; but an account-
ing could be demanded, if necessary, in order to ascertain the
purchase price. Q. Can property in one .pool be pledged to secure
advances to members of another pool? A. Yes; and if the amount
realized upon resale were not sufficient to take care of the ad-
vances, a readjustment could be made by collections from the
members who received the advances. Excessive advances may be
recovered by the association.3 4  Q. Must the property in each
pool be administered for the sole benefit of the members of each
pool? A. No, not as a matter of trust, but only insofar as is
required by the contract to pay a purchase price ascertained in a
particular way. Q. Are pool assets liable for association debts?
A. Yes, bcause there are no such things as pool assets distinct
from association assets. Commodities when delivered become the
absolute property of the association. Q. Is the association simply
an administrator of property for the benefit of individuals, and
does the equitable title belong to the pool members? A. No, the
association takes absolute title to the product; mingles it with
similar products delivered by other members; sells it; deducts
the cost of doing business, and then distributes the proceeds so
that each gets the same as every other person for the same quan-
tity, quality and grade of product. The contract is one carefully
drawn by experienced lawyers with a clear theory of the legal
result which it was desired to accomplish. The association under-
takes to pay the growers for the goods delivered to it, but there
is no mention of a trust relation of any kind, and such would be
contrary to the intention of the parties, and would involve the
association in undesirable difficulties and complications.
V. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF MARKETING CONTRACT.
It is provided in the special co-operative marketing act 5 that
the by-laws or the marketing contract may fix as liquidated dam-
ages specific sums to be paid by the member or stockholder upon
the breach by him of any provisions of the marketing contract
regarding the sale or delivery or withholding of products, and
such provisions shall not be regarded as a penalty. It is also
provided that the association shall be entitled to an injunction to
34California Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Abbott, (1911) 160 Cal. 601,
117 Pac. 767; Farmers Union Co-op. v. Schultze, (Kan. 1923) 212 Pac.
670. 35Minn., Laws, 1923, p. 342, chap. 264, sec. 18.
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prevent the breach of such contract and to a decree of specific
performance thereof. Under the general law providing for co-
operative associations, 36 there are no similar provisions, but the
courts would no doubt consider themselves authorized to ad-
minister similar remedies. It is, of course, true that under the
general act, the remedies would depend on the contract and
upon the common law. Even if the grower agrees in his con-
tract to be subject to the remedies of injunction and specific per-
formance, the court would probably not feel bound to afford such
relief unless under the circumstances of the case this would be in
accordance with the usual principles of equity.3r The remedies
of specific performance and injunction might well be allowed
the association to enforce the exclusive marketing contract, even
without a statute, in view of the inadequacy of the remedy
by damages.
In a number of recent cases, co-operative assodiations have
sought to enjoin their members from selling crops to parties
other than the association in violation.of contract. In almost all
of these cases, the relief has been granted. In a California case,
however, where the plaintiff sought specific performance of a
contract between a producer of poultry and a corporation or-
ganized by poultry men for co-operative marketing, by which
each producer agreed to sell all eggs through the corporation,
the relief was denied. This was placed on the ground that under
the civil code of California an injunction could not be granted
restraining the violation of a contract, the performance of which
.could not be specifically enforced. It was held that since the
marketing of the product called for services by the corporation
of a highly skilled and personal nature, extending over a period
of years, the contract could not be specifically enforced as against
the corporation, and hence under this statute could not be speci-
fically enforced against the producer.38
The objections to equitable relief present in the California
case would, of course, disappear where the statute expressly auth-
orizes it. For breach of the membership contract damages are an
entirely inadequate remedy. The strength of the co-operative
association depends upon its control of a sufficient supply to
36Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 326.
37Oregon Growers Co-operative Ass'n v. Lentz, (Ore. 1923) 212
Pac. 811.
3sPoultry Producers of Southern Cal. v. Barlow, (Cal. 1922) 208
Pac. 93; on specific performance of co-operative marketing agreements, see
37 Harv. L. Rev. 145; 10 Cal. L. Rev. 518.
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be a factor in the market. Dumping on the market has been an
important cause of the low prices to the farmer. The association
seeks such control that it may feed out the supply as the market
is able to absorb it. It must be able to sell large quantities of
the commodity. If the members fail to deliver their crops and
dump them on the market independently all at one time, the
whole movement tends to break down. Damages to the associa-
tions and to its members cannot be computed in any definite way.
The only adequate remedy is to force delivery of the crop to
the association and prevent the member from selling to others.
The marketing contracts usually fix a certain percentage to
be paid by the owner upon sales outside the association. Such
a liquidated damage provision has generally been upheld. In
Alabama this was sustained where it appeared that the "penalty"
was in the same amount as the authorized deduction which could
be made by the association from the proceeds of products actually
delivered. 39 Such a provision is valid where the sum fixed may
be regarded as liquidated damages, but invalid if it is to be re-
garded as a penalty. Calling a sum "liquidated damages" will
not prevent a court from finding that it is a penalty. Nor will the
use of the term "penalty" show that it is not a valid provision for
liquidated damages. The reasonableness of the agreed sum is
the important thing. It should not be out of all proportion to
the actual damages.40 Such liquidated damages may no doubt
include an estimate of the proportion of fixed charges which a
member may be expected to pay whether he deliver his produce
to the association or not, and the damages by interference with
the system of orderly marketing. Insofar as the contract provides
a penalty in addition to liquidated damages, it is unenforceable.
The remedies by specific performance and injunction as author-
ized by the standard act are also freely granted.4 1  In view of
39Ex Parte Baldwin Co. Prod. Corp., (1919) 203 Ala. 345, 83 So.
69; see also Poultry Producers of Southern Cal. v. Barlow, (Cal. 1922)
208 Pac. 93; Bullville Milk Producers Ass'n Inc. v. Armstrong, (1919)
108 Misc. 582, 178 N.Y.S. 621; Castorland Milk and Cheese Co. v.
Shantz, (1919) 179 N.Y.S. 131.40Taylor v. Times etc. Co., (1901) 83 Minn. 523, 86 N.W. 760, 85
A.S.R. 473; Womack v. Coleman, (1903) 89 Minn. 171, 93 N.W. 663;
Blunt v. Egeland, (1908) 104 Minn. 351, 116 N.W. 653; Chapman v.
Propp, (1914) 125 Minn. 447, 147 N.W. 442.41Phez Co. v. Salem Fruit Union, (1921) 103 Ore. 514, 201 Pac.
222, 205 Pac. 970, 25 A.L.R. 1113; Washington Cranberry Growers'
Ass'n v. Moore (1921) 117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773; Kansas Wheat
Growers Ass'n v. Schulte, (Kans. 1923) 216 Pac. 311; Texas Farm
Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, (Tex. 1923) 253 S. W. 1101; Oregon
Growers Co-operative Ass'n v. Lentz, (Ore. 1923) 212 Pac. 811;
Tobacco Growers Ass'n v. Jones, (N. Car. 1923) 117 S.E. 174; Pierce
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the existence of the remedy of specific performance, it may be
that a mortgagee who acquires his lien with notice of the mem-
bership contract, would take subject to the right of the associa-
tion to market the crop and deduct the expenses thereof, before
he would be entitled to the proceeds. The equitable title to the
crop would be in the association which has the right of specific
performance. Where a stranger wrongfully induces another to
commit a breach of contract, he may be held liable in a tort
action.4 2  The co-operative marketing act makes persons who
knowingly induce or attempt to induce a member to break his
marketing contract liable to the association in a penalty of $500
for each offence.
VI. THE MINNESOTA STATUTES AS TO CO-OPERATIVE
ASSOCIATIONS.
It is advisable that those who are forming a co-operative
marketing association should give careful attention to the ques-
tion of determining which is the most advantageous statute under
which to incorporate. The requirements of the Capper-Volstead
Act and the revenue law should also be considered. In Minnesota
we now have two more or less parallel statutes under which
co-operative marketing associations may be organized, which may
for convenience be referred to as the general act,43 and the
special or Sapiro Act.
44
There is certain other recent legislation which should also
be mentioned, namely, an act authorizing the incorporation of
co-operative associations to promote the -production and market-
ing of live stock by the extension of credit,45 and a somewhat
similar act 46 to authorize the organization of co-operative credit
associations to lend money to parties engaged in the production
and the marketing of various kinds of staple agricultural prod-
ucts, including live stock. These two acts are the first to pro-
vide for co-operative banking in Minnesota. Reference should
also be made to an act for the establishment of public produce
County Dairymen's Ass'n v. Templin, (Wash. 1923) 215 Pac. 352;
Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 246 S.W.
1068; Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op.' Ass'n, (Miss. 1923) 96 So. 849;
Owen Co. Burley Tobacco Soc. v. Brumback, (1908) 128 Ky. 137, 107
S.W. 710; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Burley Tobacco Ass'n,
(1912) 147 Ky. 22, 143 S.W. 1040.42Joyce v. Great Northern Ry Co., (1907) 110 Minn. 225, 110 N.W.
975, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 756.43Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 326.
44Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 264.45Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 131.46Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 141.
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warehouses which may be of use in connection with co-operative
marketing."7
The special co-operative marketing act,48 adopted by the 1923
legislature, is similar in its terms to laws recently enacted in
about thirty other states. The general statutes relating to the
organization of co-operative associations were revised and con-
solidated into a new act in 1919.4' This new act was further
amended in 1921 and again in 1923.0 There seems to have
been some rivalry and antagonism between the advocates of the
standard or special act 5 and those who have sponsored the re-
vision of the existing acts authorizing co-operative associations.
It may be well, with a view to the possible consolidation and
revision of the more or less conflicting provisions of these laws,
to summarize the principal points of difference between them.
These may be tabulated in the favorite peacemaker's form of
"fourteen points."
1. The general act provides for a corporate lifetime of thirty
years; the special act allows fifty years without renewal. It
may well be doubted whether the fixing of any definite limit of
duration on corporate existence is not apt to do more harm than
good. If a corporation inadvertently does business after its
charter has expired, by the weight of authority it is not a &
facto corporation, and its members will be held liable as partners.
2. The special act commands that the by-laws shall provide
that one director may be appointed by the commissioner of
agriculture or any other public official or commission.
3. The special act provides that the articles shall define the
property rights of members if the association is organized with-
out capital stock. It also suggests by-laws to determine the value
of a member's interest with provision for its appraisal and
purchase upon the death or withdrawal or expulsion of a mem-
ber. No such provision is made in the general act.
It may be pointed out that in the case of non-stock corpora-
tions not for profit, one who ceases to be a member of the cor-
poration from any cause loses his interest entirely. So one who
resigns or is expelled is not entitled to any compensation for his
interest in the association property or business. Those remain-
ing constitute the true association and are entitled to the use and
47Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 270, p. 352.
48Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 264.
49Minn., Laws, 1919, chap. 382.
5OMinn., Laws, 1921, chap. 23; Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 326.
5'Minn., Laws, 1923, chap. 264.
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enjoyment of the association's property.52 This doctrine might
not apply to a co-operative non-stock association, but it would
be well to make the matter entirely clear both in the statute and
in the articles and by-laws of the association.
4. The general act requires submission of the articles and
amendments to the attorney general for approval as to form and
purposes. The special act does not require this.
5. The general act requires a debt limit to be specified. The
special act does not.
6. The general act requires the rather useless formality and
expense of publishing the articles as in the case of business cor-
porations. The special act does not.
7. The general act requires acknowledgment of the articles by
all the incorporators while the special act requires the articles
to be acknowledged only by one.
8. The general act requires the filing of the articles with the
secretary of state and with the register of deeds; the special act
requires the filing with the secretary of state and with th'
public examiner, but the corporate existence is complete on filing
with the secretary of state. The general act omits any express
provision for filing proof of publication with the secretary of
state, and does not specify when corporate existence begins.
9. The general act suspends the right to commence business
until twenty per cent of the capital stock has been subscribed
and paid in. No teeth are provided for the enforcement of
this restriction which is one not yet adopted in this state as to
business corporations generally. There is the same restriction
without a sanction in the two co-operative credit association acts.
The special act imposes no such restriction on associations created
under that act.
10. The general act limits the amount of stock which may be
held by an individual to a par value of $1,000, or in case of an
association to ten per cent of its paid in capital and permanent
surplus. The special act limits the stockholder to. not more
than one-twentieth of the common stock of the association.
11. The general act provides that only the common stock shall
carry voting power. The special act provides that the associa-
tion may issue preferred stock with or without the right to vote,
which may be sold to any person.
52Clearwater Citrus Growers Ass'n v. Andrews, (Fla. 1921) 87 So.
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12. The special act has detailed suggestions as to the by-laws
covering such matters as the form of marketing contract between
the association and its members which every member may be
requested to sign. A provision is also suggested for the power to
levy assessments on each member or stockholder from time to
time, to carry on the business of the association. Provision may
be made for the automatic suspension of the rights of a member
when he ceases to be eligible to membership in the association.
13. The special act has provisions for the recall of officers
and directors and for the referendum of matters of policy to
the stockholders for decision.
14. The general act has in section 7 elaborate provisions for
building up reserves for depreciation and other possible losses,
for new buildings and equipment, and also for a permanent sur-
plus. An association is required to set aside at least ten per cent
of the annual net income until the reserves for permanent sur-
plus shall equal fifty per cent of the paid up capital. After pro-
vision has been made for such reserves, the balance of the net
income will be available for distribution among the members on
the basis of patronage, and the by-laws may provide that non-
member patrons shall participate in the distribution of such un-
divided surplus upon equal terms with member patrons. No
method is, however, provided for enforcing the requirement as
to reserves and preventing the distribution of all the income.
It has been suggested that this provision in regard to reserves
does not fit the pooling system and that it was apparently not
drawn with a view to the methods of conducting business of a
large proportion of the co-operative associations. Pooling is re-
garded as one of the most important features of the business
methods of co-operative marketing associations. It means that
each producer receives his share of the proceeds, less expense,
for his products. There are no net earnings coming to the associa-
tion upon which deductions for reserves can be computed. The
provision seems to have been framed to fit the methods of the
association which buys or sells for cash and then makes returns
in the form of trade dividends. This section might be redrafted
so as to give it more adaptability to the needs of the business.
If deductions are made from the proceeds of the crops to
build up a permanent surplus reserve, it may seem that the co-
operative principle is violated and that the patrons of the co-
operative association are mulcted for the benefit of the -stock-
holders. The surplus and the permanent improvements created
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by withholding a percentage of the proceeds payable to the patrons
for their products belong to the stockholders or members. The
ultimate beneficiaries of the surplus, additions and improvements
will, upon dissolution, be the stockholders. It may, however, be
pointed out that this is only a fair reward to the stockholders for
the risk taken by them in organizing the company, and a fair
protection against the dangers of stockholders' liability. The stock
is limited to a fixed dividend, not cumulative, amounting only to
a legal rate of interest. A number of co-operative associations
have failed disastrously for lack of an adequate reserve fund,
accumulated during seasons of prosperity to meet periods of de-
pression. A strong reserve is needed to enable the co-operative
to compete with private concerns of strong financial backing.
The present and future patrons of the association will benefit from
the use of the added capital and facilities which are usually re-
quired in order to carry on the business efficiently.
Brief mention may now be made of the co-operative credit asso-
ciation acts. Chapter 141, Laws 1923, provide for incorpor-
ating co-operative credit associations, in order to promote and
facilitate the production and marketing of the various kinds of
staple agricultural products, including live stock. This is to be
accomplished by advancing and lending money to parties engaged
in the production and marketing of such products upon the obli-
gations of the borrowers when secured by satisfactory collateral
such as warehouse receipts or chattel mortgages. This statute
follows substantially the provisions of chapter 326 relating to
co-operative associations generally, except that the articles must
be submitted to the superintendent of banks for approval. The
corporation may commence business when not less than $10,000
of the capital stock has been subscribed and paid in, but no in-
dividual liability is imposed to enforce this provision. A reserve
fund is to be established to equal the paid up capital stock. Divi-
dends to be paid on the stock shall not exceed eight per cent. After
creating the reserves provided for, net profits shall be disbursed
by uniform dividends based upon business transacted in the way
of loans made, which may be in the form of credits upon interest
due and upon the wages and salaries received by its employees.
Non-stockholders shall receive dividends to the extent of one-half
those paid to stockholders.
Chapter 131 Laws 1923 provides for the incorporation of co-
operative credit associationi to loan money upon the obligations
of the members of such associations who are producers of live
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stock, secured by satisfactory collateral or chattel mortgages on
live stock owned by members of the association. This act is in
general similar to chapter 141 except that loans may be made
only members who are producers of live stock, and net earnings
are to be disbursed to the stockholders on a pro rata basis upon
the amount of interest paid by the stockholders to the association
on loans. It is difficult to see why this entire matter of co-opera-
tive banking associations should not be consolidated in one stat-
ute, or indeed why it might not be covered in the general act
relating to co-operative associations.
Provision has been made so that co-operative associations and
others may establish licensed public produce warehouses and issue
warehouse receipts upon which money can be borrowed. By
chapter 270, Laws 1923, provision is made by which the commis-
sioner of agriculture may issue licenses, require bonds, and in-
spect and supervise such warehouses. The purpose is to make
the warehouse receipts approved collateral upon which the banker
may rely. Co-operative marketing organizations may have sub-
sidiary corporations to provide facilities for warehousing. It
will, no doubt, be better to have warehouse receipts issued by
a separate organization as bailee, in order that the marketing
association may not have to issue warehouse receipts to itself
for its own produce upon which it wishes to borrow money.
VII. STOCKHOLDERS' CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY.
Members of non-stock associations are not liable for the debts
of the association, except to the extent of the unpaid balance
due on the membership fee. A certificate of membership would
differ from a certificate of stock mainly in carrying no right
to dividends. Stockholders of a co-operative association, how-
ever, are subject to the constitutional double liability for its
debts if the corporation is not organized solely for manufacturing
or mechanical purposes. 3 In Kraemer v. Tellin,5 ' a corporation
organized for the manufacture of butter, cheese, and other prod-
ucts of milk and cream, and to sell and dispose of said products
when manufactured, and to carry on all business essential thereto,
which shall include the buying of dairy stock and selling it to
the farmers to encourage the dairy industry, was held not or-
ganized exclusively for the purpose of carrying on a manufactur-
63Lebens v. Nelson, (1921) 148 Minn. 240, 181 N.W. 350; Lindeke
v. Scott Co. Co-op. Co., (1914) 126 Minn. 464, 148 N.W. 459.5
'(Minn. 1923) 191 N.W. 735.
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ing or mechanical business; and hence creditors could if need
be invoke the constitutional liability of stockholders.
As was pointed out in an article by the writer on Stockholders
Liability in Minnesota :
"Our constitutional double liability is contrary to the public
interest and out of date except as to banks and financial cor-
porations. It results in substantial public inconvenience and loss;
it is a sword hanging over the head of unsuspecting investors;
it discriminates unfairly against Minnesota corporations in favor
of foreign corporations, and deprives the state of a large and
legitimate source of income from corporation fees and taxes be-
cause new enterprises are forced to seek incorporation in other
states."
The only remedy is a constitutional amendment by which this
double liability may be destroyed. One can see no justification
for continuing it as to Minnesota corporations when foreign
corporations are necessarily permitted to do business in the state
without such liability. With this removed there would be no
difficulty in authorizing non par stock corporations such as may
be organized in most of the other states.
VIII. EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL INCOME TAX.
Co-operative associations may claim exemption from federal
income taxes provided they bring themselves within the provisions
of the revenue act and of the regulations under it. The federal
revenue act of 1921, section 231, (11) provides that the following
organizations, among others, shall be exempt from income tax:
"Farmers', fruit growers', or like associations organized and
operated as sales agents for the purpose of marketing the products
of their members, and turning back to them the proceeds of sales,
less the necessary selling expenses, on the basis of the quantity
of produce furnished by them; or organized and operated as pur-
chasing agents for the purpose of purchasing supplies and equip-
ment for the use of members and turning over such supplies and
equipment to such members at actual cost, plus necessary ex-
penses."
If the proceeds of the business are distributed in any other
way than on such a proportionate basis, the association does not
meet the requirement of the statute and is not exempt.
Article 522 of the regulations under the revenue act of 1921
provides that:
"The accumulation and maintenance of a reasonable reserve
for depreciation or possible losses or a reserve required by state
statute or a reasonable sinking fund or surplus to provide for
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the erection of buildings and facilities required in business, or
for the purchase and installation of machinery and equipment,
or to retire indebtedness incurred for such purposes, will not de-
stroy the exemption. A corporation organized to act as a sales
agent for farmers, or to market co-operatively the products of
the farm, and having a capital stock on which it pays a dividend
not exceeding the legal rate of interest in the state in which it
is incorporated and in which substantially all of the outstanding
capital stock is owned by actual producers, will not for such
reasons be denied exemption, but any ownership of stock by
others than actual producers who market their products through
the association must be satisfactorily explained in the application
for exemption. In every case the association will be required to
show that the ownership of its capital stock has been restricted
as far as possible to actual producers, and that the association
has not voluntarily sold or issued any stock to non-producers
. . . In order to be exempt . . an association must
establish that it has no net income for its own account, other
than that reflected in a reserve, sinking fund or surplus specifically
authorized in paragraph (a)."
Co-operatives do not lose their exemption if they transact
business with and for non-members provided such business does
not exceed that transacted with and for members of the associ-
ation. But if they do not pay a refund to non-members in the
same manner and amount as to members, they are not entitled to
exemption and must pay taxes on their net income.56
56It is required that a co-operative association which desires to
establish its right to exemption shall file an affidavit with the collector
in the district in which it is located, showing the character of the or-
ganization and various other matters. When an association has estab-
lished its right to exemption, it need not thereafter make a return of
income so long as it continues to operate on the same basis. The
services of the accounting division of the department .of agriculture
of the state are available to all co-operative associations in the state
under the provisions of chapter 284, Laws 1923. Associations desir-
ing accounting services in the matter of installing accounting systems
or of income tax exemptions and refunds, should direct their inquiries
to the Commissioner of Agriculture, Old Capital, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Forms for incorporation under the general act can be procured from
the same source.
